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        Concealment of birth: time to repeal a 200-year-old 
“convenient stop-gap”? 
 
Introduction   
The criminal offence of concealment of birth (concealment) prohibits the secret disposal of the 
dead body of a child in order to conceal knowledge of that child’s birth under English and 
Welsh criminal law.1 Most prosecutions are of women who have concealed or denied their 
pregnancy, then given birth alone, with the child dying around the time of birth, and the woman 
disposing of the body without informing another person of the existence of the child. The 
offence is closely connected to newborn infant homicide and defendants are often suspected of 
being responsible for the child’s death. While the offence can be committed by anyone, the 
defendant is most often the birth mother.2 The offence is rarely prosecuted with only four 
convictions between 2010 and 2014 (Milne 2017), and since 2002 only one person has received 
an immediate custodial sentence. 3 However, despite the small number of convictions and 
nature of the sentence, the offence is significant, particularly when analysed from a feminist 
perspective. Beyond the few women who will become subject to this criminal offence, 
concealment has significance for wider society as it illustrates the entrenched views of 
motherhood and appropriate maternal behaviour that continue to perpetuate in society today.  
The offence is historical, first formally enacted in 1803 when it was only applicable to 
unmarried women. Since creation, concealment has been subject to criticism (Williams 1958; 
Sheldon 2016). Davies (1937 213) referred to the offence as a “convenient stop-gap”, which 
allowed women to be punished even if homicide could not be proven. In spite of such criticism, 
                                                 
1 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s 60; R v Rosenberg [1906] 70 JP 264. 
2 Since 2000 only one man was convicted of the offence alongside the birth mother. All other convictions have 
been of the birth mother (Milne 2017). 
3 In 2017 a woman was jailed for one year (Corken and Naylor 2017). 
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the offence has received little public or political scrutiny, and was excluded from the Law 
Commission’s (2014) examination of other offences within the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861 (OAPA). 4  
This paper offers the first assessment of concealment from a feminist perspective, 
considering the offence as an example of gender-based injustice experienced by women whose 
behaviour is deemed to require criminal sanction. As with abortion,5 concealment provides 
gendered moral judgement of women’s behaviour. Analysis of the offence illustrates how 
judgements of women’s characters impacts the creation, continued existence and application 
of criminal law. In this respect, feminist researchers and activists need to raise awareness of 
such forms of structural prejudice that exist within law, even if only directly impacting a small 
number of women (Fletcher 2015). Through analysis of three contemporary cases of 
concealment, and the historic legacy of the offence, this paper considers the nature of 
concealment – how it is used by prosecutors to convict women of an offence where murder is 
suspected but cannot be proven, and how it is used to sanction the behaviour of women who 
fail to meet idealised images of femininity and motherhood. First, I will outline the elements 
of the offence and summarise the case studies. I will then go on to evaluate the historic origins 
of concealment and how the offence is used today, exemplifying an example of gendered 
injustice. I will conclude by outlining why the offence of concealment of birth has no further 
place in English and Welsh criminal law. 
The Offence 
To commit the offence of concealment, the defendant must secretly dispose of the body 
of a child; the child must have developed sufficiently in utero to have a fair chance of surviving 
                                                 
4 Concealment was excluded, despite the offence containing the same flaws identified with the statute more 
generally as the offence “raise[ed] issues going well beyond the law of offences against the person” (2014, 53-4). 
5 OAPA, s 58; Abortion Act 1967. See Sheldon (2016). 
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outside the womb.6 The child need not have been born alive, but if it was, then it must be dead 
prior to the concealment. A secret disposal of the body is defined as a body being placed in a 
location where it is unlikely to be found; a secluded place infrequently visited, for example at 
the top of a mountain, or inside a wardrobe that is inaccessible to others.7 The mens rea of the 
offence is to endeavour to conceal the birth of a child. The concealment is from the world at 
large, not from particular individuals.8 The offence is not concerned with how the child dies 
and so has been committed in circumstances where a child is stillborn, born alive and dies 
through no fault of the pregnant woman or a third party, or born alive and killed through an act 
or omission. As such, the offence can be charged in conjunction with a homicide offence and 
an offence against the person, as well as the unlawful procuring of a miscarriage9 and child 
destruction.10 The reason for concealing the birth, and subsequently the dead body, are not of 
importance to the offence. The maximum sentence is imprisonment for two years. Concealment 
is not unique to England and Wales; similar offences were enacted in former British colonies. 
                                                 
6 In R v Berriman [1854] 6 Cox CC 388 and R v Hewitt, R v Smith [1866] 4 F & F 1101 it was ruled that a child 
born before the seventh gestational month would be unlikely to be born alive and so concealment had not been 
committed. Medical advances have resulted in the point of viability in the UK being classified as 24 gestational 
weeks. As such, while there is no legal authority on this point, it is probable that the law of concealment would 
not come into effect prior to this point in pregnancy. This assessment would be in line with the legal definition of 
a stillbirth (Still-Birth (Definition) Act 1992, s 1). If the foetus dies before being fully born prior to the pregnancy 
reaching 24 gestational weeks this is considered to be a miscarriage rather than a stillbirth. As it is not necessary 
to register a miscarriage, it seems unlikely that concealment could be applied in such instances of foetal death. 
7 R v Brown [1870] LR 1 CCR 244. See also R v Waterage [1846] 1 Cox CC 338; R v Sleep [1864] 9 Cox CC 
559; R v George [1868] 11 Cox CC 41; R v Cook [1870] 11 Cox CC 542. 
8 R v Higley [1830] 4 C & P 366; R v Morris [1848] 2 Cox CC 489. 
9 OAPA, s 58. 
10 Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, s 1. 
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For example, in Massachusetts, USA, it is a criminal offence to conceal the death of an infant 
born ‘out of wedlock’.11   
 
Cases 
To assess contemporary use of concealment, I present analysis of court transcripts of 
sentencing hearings of three women convicted of the offence in England and Wales between 
2010 and 2014. These cases were analysed as part of a wider project (Milne 2017), which 
examined responses by criminal justice in cases where women were suspected of causing, or 
attempting to cause, the death of their newborn children, and convicted of offences related to 
this suspicion.12 Through analysis of media reporting and Serious Case Reviews,13 fourteen 
cases were identified, and transcripts were available in seven,14 with three of those seven cases 
resulting in concealment convictions.15 All seven transcripts were analysed in two ways for 
different purposes. Firstly, for their content, to consider what was said about the women within 
the setting of the court hearing. This analysis was completed using thematic analysis to draw 
                                                 
11 Massachusetts General Law c 272, s 22. The offence has not been committed if the child is born to a married 
woman. 
12 Ethical approval for the study was obtained from the Department of Sociology at the University of Essex and 
the research conformed to the guidelines outlined in the British Sociological Association's Statement of Ethical 
Practice. 
13 Review evaluating individual and agency practice where a child has died, and abuse or neglect are known or 
suspected. 
14 Lack of information to locate the cases meant three were excluded, and a further four were excluded as the 
transcripts were unavailable due to the tapes being destroyed. 
15 In the other four cases, women were convicted of Infanticide, Procuring a Miscarriage and Child Cruelty. A 
further case of concealment was identified in the initial sample but could not be included due to the tapes of the 
transcripts having been destroyed.  
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meaning from the content of the sentence hearing as a reflection of the situations and events 
they depict (Spencer et al. 2013). The second analysis considered how the law was utilised in 
each case, behaviours deemed to warrant criminalisation and the offences used to secure a 
conviction. This paper is based on data from both forms of analysis, relating specifically to the 
cases where concealment convictions were secured.16 As these cases have not been reported, 
and in line with the permission to view the transcripts granted by the courts, I have used 
pseudonyms and withheld identifying details. The three women convicted are Hannah, Lily 
and Sally.  
Hannah was in her mid-twenties when she discovered she was pregnant. She was unable 
to terminate the pregnancy due to being over the 24-week legal limit to access an abortion on 
the grounds that ‘the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the 
pregnancy were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant woman 
or any existing children of her family’.17 Consequently, she continued her pregnancy to full-
term, concealing her condition from her family and friends. She gave birth to the child at home 
in her bedroom. The child was born alive and lived for between five minutes and two hours. 
Hannah maintains she passed out following the delivery and that the baby died before she 
regained consciousness. The cause of death could not be ascertained. Hannah left the baby in 
a friend’s front garden and resumed her daily activities. The body was found, and Hannah was 
later identified by the police through the DNA of the baby’s father who advised that Hannah 
was the mother. After initially being arrested for murder, Hannah was later charged with 
concealment and child cruelty due to not seeking medical assistance for the child, and pleaded 
                                                 
16 Due to the analysis being conducted over all seven cases, it is not possible to present the themes identified only 
in relation to concealment cases, as the themes would have limited meaning outside the context of the wider 
project.  
17 Abortion Act 1967, s 1(1)(a). 
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guilty to both. During her sentencing hearing, both the prosecution and the defence made it 
clear that Hannah had believed she could not have a baby ‘out of wedlock’ due to the 
expectations of her family, based on their cultural beliefs, the prosecution arguing that this was 
the reason she had kept her pregnancy secret and had not sought medical assistance for the 
child. In contrast, the defence emphasised the impact of family and cultural pressures on 
Hannah’s situation, and so her decision to keep her pregnancy a secret, “So the options that are 
open to most of us, should we find ourselves in this situation, were simply not open to her”. 
The defence drew on written evidence from a psychiatrist to support their case, noting Hannah 
experienced “severe, moderate to severe, symptoms of depression, anxiety”, in part due to the 
“pressure exerted by cultural norms”. In sentencing, the judge was satisfied that the two 
offences crossed the custody threshold and that a non-custodial sentence could not be justified. 
Hannah was sentenced for both offences to imprisonment for 26-weeks, which was suspended 
for two years. The condition of the suspension was a 12-month supervision order and directions 
for psychological interventions. 
Lily, a woman in her mid-thirties, was living in an abusive and violent relationship 
when she discovered she was pregnant. Unable to attend an appointment to access an abortion 
due to her partner preventing her from leaving the house, Lily continued her pregnancy without 
obtaining medical assistance. During the sentencing hearing it was reported that Lily’s partner 
claimed to be unaware that she was pregnant, despite her pregnancy being visible to other 
people. After giving birth alone, which Lily states occurred following an assault to the stomach 
by her partner, Lily buried the baby’s body in the garden of the house in which she was living 
at the time. Four years later the body was found, and several years after that, Lily alerted the 
police that she was the mother following a call for witnesses. Due to the decomposed state of 
the body, it was not possible to determine if the child had been born dead or alive, but Lily 
maintained that the child had been stillborn. It is not clear from the transcript which offence(s) 
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Lily was originally suspected of committing, but she appeared in court charged with offences 
on two indictments; the first had two counts – concealment and preventing the lawful burial of 
the corpse,18 and the second indictment had ten counts relating to dishonesty and fraudulent 
offences. Lily pleaded guilty to all counts. In sentencing, the judge outlined that Lily’s offences 
warranted a two-year prison sentence, which would be reduced by one-third due to her early 
guilty plea. However, the judge ruled that due to having been imprisoned for 10 days upon 
arrest, and curfew and tagging prior to sentencing, Lily would be granted a further reduction 
of 166 days and so would only be returning to prison for, “…a couple of months, and that in 
the end does not seem to me to be a productive exercise...” As such, Lily was sentenced to a 
community order of 12 months with a supervision requirement for that period. In sentencing, 
the judge favoured the arguments put forward by the defence, that Lily’s offending had been a 
consequence of her relationship with her abusive partner, 
The Prosecution have suggested that whereas your relationship was a stormy one, 
signifying as it were a mutual tendency to unruly behaviour and disputation, there 
is overwhelming evidence in my judgment that you were subject to serious and 
sustained domestic violence… his violence and behaviour in the relationship must 
have had to do with your initiations into crime, for until you met him you had not 
committed an offence. 
There is no information available to suggest Lily’s partner was prosecuted for the violence and 
abuse committed against Lily, including the assault that allegedly resulted in pre-term labour. 
Over a ten-year period, Sally experienced four pregnancies, receiving no medical care at 
any stage of each pregnancy. Following the birth of each child she hid their bodies in the 
wardrobe in her bedroom. At the time of the pregnancies, Sally was in her thirties, living in 
                                                 
18 A common law offence discussed below. 
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social housing and raising her children alone. Due to the length of time between the birth of 
the children and discovery of their bodies, it was not possible to determine whether they had 
been born alive and, if so, how they had died. Sally stated that they had been stillborn, and this 
was the basis of the prosecution’s case. She is described in the sentencing remarks as leading 
a “chaotic and dysfunctional lifestyle”, frequently abusing alcohol, using cannabis, and having 
sexual relationships with numerous men. Following discovery of the bodies by a family 
member, Sally was prosecuted for, and pleaded guilty to, four counts of concealing birth. For 
each offence, Sally was sentenced to a community order for two years, subject to supervision 
for the whole period. While the judge was of the opinion that the threshold for custody had 
been passed, the mitigation presented (Sally’s age meaning “there is no risk of any future 
similar activity”; being a person of good character; and the trauma of “suffering four stillborn 
deaths and hav[ing] had to live with the consequences of those deaths and the concealment 
which must have caused [her] many anxious and distressing moments”) meant the judge was 
satisfied that a suspended sentence was appropriate.19  
 
Crisis Pregnancy 
The three women’s responses to their pregnancies and the birth of their children may seem 
unusual, but such behaviour is by no means rare,20 and needs to be understood as responding 
to a ‘crisis pregnancy’. By using the term ‘crisis pregnancy’ I am referring to an instance where 
a woman feels unable to determine how to approach her pregnancy and what decisions to make 
about the future of the pregnancy/foetus/child, causing her a crisis. Examples of such a situation 
                                                 
19 I was only granted permission to view the judge’s sentencing remarks for Sally’s sentencing hearing. Therefore, 
I have fewer details of this case than Hannah’s and Lily’s. 
20 It is estimated that, in England and Wales, approximately 280 pregnancies are concealed/denied each year, with 
at least seven of those cases resulting in the death of the child around the time of birth (Milne 2017). 
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are that the woman may be terrified of her parents finding out she is pregnant, particularly if 
she is very young; she may be in an abusive relationship and therefore not be able to seek 
medical assistance to end the pregnancy; or the knowledge of the pregnancy may panic her to 
such an extent that she feels unable to respond to the pregnancy. Such experiences of pregnancy 
often result in a woman concealing and/or denying her pregnancy from herself and/or the 
people around her.21 The consequence of the concealment/denial is that the expected symptoms 
and bodily changes of pregnancy can be misinterpreted, significantly reduced or absent 
(Brezinka et al. 1994). Crisis pregnancy should not be assumed to be an unwanted pregnancy 
(Vellut et al. 2012), and an unwanted pregnancy is not necessarily cause for crisis if adequate 
and safe means to end that pregnancy are available and easily accessible.22  
Concealment/denial is most readily conceptualised as a ‘reproductive dysfunction’ 
(Beier et al. 2006), but as Marshall (2012) argues, the point of discovering a pregnancy, and 
accepting that pregnancy with the intention to make decisions about the future, can be 
perceived as a choice. Using this logic, not acknowledging a pregnancy and determining a 
response can also be seen as a choice, even if in making it a woman is “regarded as powerless 
and paralysed” (2012, 332).23 A further aspect of concealed/denied pregnancy is that such 
                                                 
21 There is dispute in the literature as to whether a person can be unaware of their pregnancy, and therefore whether 
it is indeed a denial or a conscious decision to conceal. Analysis of this literature would suggest that concealment 
and denial cannot be easily separated, and that women may experience both during pregnancy (Amon et al. 2012; 
Beier et al. 2006; Brezinka et al. 1994; Spinelli 2001). I find it more helpful to refer to the experience as 
‘concealed/denied pregnancy’, as this captures the blurred boundaries in terms of terminology and the lived 
experience.  
22 With thanks to Professor Sally Sheldon for this important point.  
23 Marshall goes on to argue that women who decide to give up a child for adoption are often confronted with 
arguments that they will regret their choice, or that the choice is not natural. On this basis, Marshall argues that 
women’s decisions are perceived as inauthentic and therefore impermissible. While the circumstances of giving 
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experiences of pregnancy are considered to be risk factors for neonaticide. However, as Vellut 
et al. (2012) and Milne (2017) have argued, the connection is given too much weight, and often 
there is conflation between concealed/denied pregnancies, which are neither uncommon nor 
likely to end in neonaticide, and neonaticide, which is very rare and is almost always preceded 
by a concealed/denied pregnancy. Furthermore, while a concealed/denied pregnancy may 
occasionally result in the death of the child, there is very limited evidence to support the idea 
that a woman has purposefully hidden her pregnancy to kill the child. Research that considers 
the circumstances and motives of neonaticide has concluded that women are mostly responding 
to the situations in their lives which mean they do not feel able to reveal their pregnancy, even 
to themselves. For example, Beyer et al. (2008) argue that women’s actions or inactions during 
pregnancy and at the time of birth are often motivated by fear, associated with shame and guilt 
at being pregnant, and concern about the reaction of parents, partners and others if the 
pregnancy is discovered. Similarly, Oberman (2003) argues that maternal filicide is deeply 
embedded in, and responsive to, the societies in which it occurs.  
 
Concealing Birth: An Age-Old Concern 
To appreciate the gendered injustice of concealment, it is necessary to explore the history of 
the offence. Concealment has its origins in the 1624 statute An Act to Prevent the Destroying 
and Murthering of Bastard Children. The legislation removed, from the Crown, the burden of 
proving live birth and separate existence of a newborn child in cases where the mother was 
                                                 
a child up for adoption are different from the process through which a pregnancy is concealed/denied, and I do 
not wish to conflate the two, there are striking similarities in terms of societal responses to women’s choices in 
these circumstances; perceptions that concealment/denial of pregnancy, or giving a child up for adoption, for 
selfish reasons stem from ideologies relating to motherhood and women’s roles as mothers, see Douglas and 
Michaels (2005) and Silva (1996). 
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unmarried and had concealed the death of her child. To prove her innocence, a woman had to 
provide one witness to testify that stillbirth had occurred. Without such evidence, the accused 
would be sentenced to death “as in the case of murder”, whether the child “were borne alive or 
not”. Prior to this, a murder conviction could only be obtained, regardless of the defendant’s 
marital status, if it could be proven that the child was born alive; as this was difficult to prove, 
convictions were hard to secure. The requirement for live birth to be proven is a facet of English 
law that is still in place today, as to be recognised as a legal person who enjoys all protections 
of the law, a person must have a separate existence, and thus be a “reasonable creature in Rerum 
natura [in existence]” (Coke 1681 50-1). If it can be proven that a child was alive upon its 
entire body being expelled from the birth canal, and had independent circulation and breathed 
after birth,24 it is possible to convict the perpetrator of an offence against the person or a 
homicide offence, if that child is then killed or allowed to die. Without proof of live birth, such 
criminal offences cannot be drawn upon. 
While securing more convictions may have been the driver for creation of the Act, the 
context of the statute lies in political, legal and public concern with ‘bastardy’ under newly 
reformed poor laws (Beattie 1986; Jackson 1996). Parents of illegitimate children were fined 
and women who refused to name the father were subject to corporal punishment and 
imprisonment. During this period, there was little tolerance of unmarried mothers, who could 
expect to lose employment and have limited prospects of finding future work. By placing the 
burden of proving the child was born dead upon the accused woman, the 1624 statute facilitated 
bringing criminal sanctions against unmarried women. The significance of increasing the ease 
of prosecution was due to the perception that unmarried women were attempting to escape 
punishment under both the poor law and the common law offence of murder by hiding their 
                                                 
24 R v Poullton [1832] 5 C&P 329; R v Enoch [1833] 5 C&P 539; R v Reeves [1839] 9 C&P 25; R v Brain [1834] 
C&P 349. 
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pregnancy, killing the child following birth and then claiming it had been stillborn. Following 
enactment of the 1624 legislation, evidence of concealment of the birth and death of an 
illegitimate child provided “almost conclusive evidence of the child’s being murdered by its 
mother” (Blackstone 1791, 198).  
The nature of the 1624 Act and subsequent prosecutions had a clear moral focus. While 
the practice of concealing a pregnancy was common to all women during this period, marital 
status had a fundamental impact upon how a woman who concealed pregnancy was treated by 
the community. While the killing of both legitimate and illegitimate newborn children 
persisted, unwed women were the focus of prosecutions, while married people were, mostly, 
afforded privacy to decide the size of their family, allowing unwanted children to die; a historic 
practice that was still tolerated, albeit conducted discreetly (Rapaport 2006). Such disparity in 
behaviour supports the conclusion that the 1624 statute and subsequent prosecutions reflected 
concern over sexual morality and regulation of the female body, not the wellbeing of newborn 
children (Jackson 1996). 
The initial increase in convictions that followed the 1624 Act were quickly mitigated, 
and by the second half of the eighteenth century unmarried women were more often tried under 
the principles of presumed dead at birth, requiring evidence of live birth and murder to secure 
a conviction (Beattie 1986; Jackson 1996). The subsequent low conviction rates resulted in 
concern by political and legal commenters that, once again, women were getting away with the 
murder of their illegitimate infants. To address this perceived weakness in the law, the Lord 
Chief Justice introduced a Bill in 1803, repealing the 1624 Act, formally reinstating the 
presumption of dead at birth for unmarried women, and creating the offence of concealment,  
…if any Woman be delivered of any Issue of her Body, Male or Female, which 
being born alive, should by the Laws of this Realm be a Bastard, and that she 
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endeavour… to conceal the Death thereof… in every such Case the said Mother 
shall suffer Death as in case of Murder.25  
The proposal that concealment would become a new capital offence suggests that the principles 
of the 1624 Act remained – unmarried women who concealed their pregnancies, followed by 
the death of the infant, whose body they then concealed, were presumed to have killed the child 
and would be executed as if they had, unless they could prove the child had been stillborn. 
However, concealment did not become a new capital punishment, as amendments made to the 
Bill included reduction of the maximum sentence to imprisonment for two years.26  
While the punishment was far less severe than originally proposed, the offence provided 
means to prosecute women whose behaviour led to a suspected, but unproven, homicide. 
Concealment was not a substantive offence at this point and a woman could only be convicted 
of concealment if she had been tried for murder. In such cases the jury could rule that she was 
not guilty of murder, but guilty of concealment. The focus on unmarried women, rather than 
all women, suggests this legislation was still as much about punishing women deemed to be 
sexually promiscuous, as it was attempting to gain a conviction when evidence was lacking. 
Concealment continued to be viewed as evidence of further wrong-doing, and so deserving 
punishment. The change in law made the behaviour criminal for only a select group of the 
population – unmarried women.  
                                                 
25 House of Lords Sessional Papers (1714-1805). A Bill, intituled, an Act for the further prevention of malicious 
shooting, stabbing, cutting, wounding, and poisoning, and also the malicious setting fire to buildings; and also 
for repealing a certain Act, made in the first year of the late King James the First, intituled, an act to prevent the 
destroying and murthering of bastard children, and for substituting other provisions in lieu of the same. v1. 3 
December 1802 to 1 July 1803. 117-20. 
26 No records exist of discussions that led to the changes to the Bill; Jackson (1996) concludes from his research 
that the precise origins of the final construction of the 1803 status are unknown. 
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The offence of concealment was amended twice during the nineteenth century. Firstly 
in 1828, when it became a substantive criminal offence which did not rely upon a charge of 
murder, and could be applied to any woman, regardless of her marital status.27 Parliamentary 
debates relating to the change in the offence illustrate that it was believed that married women 
might be as likely to conceal the birth and death of a newborn child if the circumstances of the 
pregnancy were undesirable, such as due to an extra-marital affair.28 Rapaport (2006) argues 
that married women became subject to the law partly due to growing concern over children and 
the apparent hypocrisy of exempting ‘respectable’ women from the reach of the law, but, more 
importantly, due to growing focus upon motherhood as a sign of womanly virtue, in 
conjunction with chastity (Davidoff and Hall 1987). The second change to the law occurred in 
1861, when the offence was amended to include any person who endeavours to conceal birth.29 
It is under this legislation that the offence of concealment still operates today. However, it is 
no longer possible to be convicted of concealment following a not guilty verdict on an 
indictment of murder.30 A concealment conviction can only be obtained following indictment 
for that offence.  
 
Concealment Today 
As outlined in the historical account of the offence, concealment has been used as a means to 
prosecute women when homicide is suspected, but cannot be proven. Analysis of contemporary 
use of the offence would suggest that prosecutors continue to use concealment for this purpose, 
for example, in Lily’s case. As the body of her child was not discovered until four years after 
                                                 
27 Offences Against the Person Act 1828. 
28 Hansard [HC Deb] 05 May 1828, Home Secretary, Sir Robert Peel. vol 19, col 353. 
29 OAPA, s 60. No debate about the change in the offence occurred in Parliament.  
30 Criminal Law Act 1967, s 2 13(1)(a). 
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the birth, it was not possible to determine if the child had been born alive due to the decomposed 
state of the body. Despite no evidence of live birth, which would have supported a belief that 
Lily had harmed or caused the death of the child, during the sentencing hearing the prosecution 
suggested Lily’s decision to bury the body of her baby may have been made to hide evidence 
that the child had been born alive. As the judge surmised, “There has been a veiled suggestion 
in the case, and I put it no higher than that, that there may have been something suspicious 
about the birth and your subsequent behaviour”. The prosecution also made several references 
to the fact that Lily had not sought medical assistance, despite being “injured badly”, and that 
following the birth “she had been bleeding a lot but had sought no medical assistance”. The 
judge acknowledged this suspicion during sentencing, but concluded, “You were never 
charge[d] of course with any homicide… and I dismiss any suggestion, veiled or otherwise, 
that there was something sinister about your birth of the child and procuring its birth.” 
Similarly, in Sally’s case, it was not possible to tell how the babies had died and the judge made 
clear in sentencing that she had not been convicted of a homicide offence. However, an 
obstetrician who gave written evidence as an expert witness noted that it was unusual for a 
woman to experience four stillbirths after giving birth to other live born children. 
Consequently, while the death of the infants was not a factor of her conviction, there may have 
been a belief that she could have been responsible for the death of the children.  
In Hannah’s case, the suspicion of responsibility for the death of the child is more 
apparent, as she was initially arrested for murder and was convicted of child cruelty. 
Consequently, concealment was not needed to act as a proxy for homicide. A very subtle 
suggestion is made by the prosecution, presenting evidence from a consultant neonatologist, 
that while the cause of the baby’s death was unascertained, it was nevertheless unusual and 
thus perhaps suspicious, “He stated in his evidence that the sudden unexplained collapse in the 
early period after birth in a well infant, born full-term, as this child was, is rare”. Despite noting 
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that Hannah had claimed to have passed-out, an experience of other women following giving 
birth alone (Oberman 1996), no reference was made to this possibility by the prosecution 
barrister as they concluded their case,  
She sought no assistance with the birth as she sought to keep it a secret. She sought 
no assistance for the newborn child and it died without any attempt, it would 
appear, by the defendant to give it the care the child required. 
In her defence, Hannah’s barrister reminded the court of Hannah’s claim to have been 
unconscious, 
What is apparent from what the defendant said to those tending to her upon her 
arrest was that… she did make it plain to those who were speaking to her, and again 
without the benefit then of any legal advice telling her that this was a smart thing 
to say, she told the nurses when she was first spoken to that very shortly after giving 
birth and cutting the umbilical cord in her own bedroom, that she passed out. She 
doesn’t know how long she was unconscious for and it may well be that when she 
came round the child was already dead. We simply don’t know. And again, I invite 
your Honour to bear that in mind. 
Dispute over Hannah’s consciousness at the time of the child’s death is of importance 
due to the implication it could have had upon sentencing, with the judge concluding, “it 
is still a mystery perhaps as to the course of action that you took following her birth”. 
However, as Hannah pleaded guilty to the charges, there was no need for the prosecution 
to prove Hannah’s consciousness and thus culpability for the death of the child; the 
implication given is either that they do not believe she had been unconscious, or that her 
duty towards the child was such that she should not have allowed herself to be in a 
position whereby the child could have been left without care post-birth. This would have 
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required Hannah to anticipate the delivery and postpartum unconsciousness (discussed 
below).  
Nevertheless, a further query exists as to the inclusion of concealment on the 
indictment. The context of Hannah’s abandonment of the child’s body meant 
concealment had not, technically, been committed as the body had been easily found,31 
as the prosecution reported, 
[Name] left his house twice on the morning of [date], and on the second occasion 
glanced to his left and saw a small bundle which at that time looked to him simply 
like some rubbish. It was in the farthest corner of that small garden near the wall, 
and when he approached it he saw it was a body of a newborn child. 
In Hannah’s case, the prosecutors may have used concealment to ensure a conviction was 
secured in case the main offence suspected to have been committed was unsuccessfully 
prosecuted. Such practice by the Crown reflects the historic practice in concealment 
convictions whereby women were charged with concealment and murder in the hope that 
concealment would be obtained if the murder charge was dropped or if the defendant was 
found not guilty of murder (Higginbotham 1989). 
The similarity between the three cases is that each woman had been suspected of being 
responsible for the death of their infants. In each case, the evidence available prevents homicide 
from being proven; while the offence of concealment remains relatively easy to prove. 
Suggestions in court that the women may have killed their children indicates that the offence 
of concealment was used to facilitate convictions where none might otherwise have been 
                                                 
31 R v Clark [1883] 15 Cox CC 171. 
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possible. Use of the offence in this manner challenges the presumption of innocence;32 a point 
made by Williams (1958) in his critique of the offence published fifty years ago. Furthermore, 
if a homicide offence is suspected, but unproven, and concealment is used instead, then the 
offence the defendant is convicted of, and thus the label of offending prescribed, does not match 
their suspected behaviour.33 Davies (1937 216) also made this point, characterising the offence 
as “perpetuat[ing] the ‘mischief’ of defeating the law of homicide”, and similar views were 
expressed by members of the judiciary during the Victorian period (Higginbotham 1989). 
Employing offences that are easier to prove than the offence believed to have been 
committed is neither unusual nor, arguably, uncontroversial within criminal justice practice.34 
However, the significance of the use of concealment lies in its historic legacy, as analysed 
above, and the connection to newborn child death and crisis pregnancy. These aspects make 
concealment a form of gendered injustice. The offence is not itself gendered in that it can be 
committed by anyone; however, the nature and context of a crisis pregnancy are such that the 
experiences that could lead to the offence of concealment being committed are overwhelmingly 
reserved for women. It is women who bear children,35 and when a pregnancy causes a crisis to 
a woman, it is very likely that it will be that woman who will find a means of coping with the 
difficulties of that crisis. Concealment as gendered injustice is explored in the next section. 
 
                                                 
32 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462; [1936] 25 Cr App R 72, at 95. European Convention on Human Rights, 
Art 6(2). 
33 Jones and Quigley (2016) make this point in relation to the offence of preventing lawful and decent burial, 
which they argue has also been used to criminalise suspected but unproven homicide.  
34 However, it does come with its difficulties, as argued by McGlynn et al. (2017) in their analysis of using 
voyeurism laws to facilitate prosecution of defendants engaged in revenge porn. 
35 This point is made with full awareness that gender is performative (Butler 2010), and that people who identify 
as male, or do not prescribe to the gender binary, can and do become pregnant (Halberstam 2010). 
19 
 
Concealment as Gendered (In)justice 
The principle that the criminal justice system operates on the basis of gender, among other 
intersecting identities (Crenshaw 1989), and that criminal law is written with the white, middle-
class man in mind, has been the subject of much feminist examination of law, crime and 
deviance. There is substantial evidence from feminist scholarship that women who are 
sanctioned for breaking the law are punished as much for who they are (a woman), as for what 
they do (Barlow 2016; Carlen 1983; Fitz-Gibbon and Vannier 2017; Hodgson 2017; Lloyd 
1995). The dated, yet pertinent, study by Eaton (1986) offers an example of gendered justice. 
Eaton analysed magistrates’ sentencing decisions, examining the professional representations 
of men and women defendants. She concluded that not only were representations gendered but, 
in portraying women, narratives were constructed based on traditional perceptions of family 
life and of feminine behaviour. Such findings continue to be reflected in contemporary studies 
examining responses to women who break the law, with most recent research focusing on 
women who commit serious and violent offences. For example, in analysis of women convicted 
of offences relating to the killing of their children, Weare (2016) argues that, in the courtroom, 
narratives are constructed about women defendants by drawing on traditional gender roles to 
explain their behaviour within the frames of the ‘good’ mother. The more a woman’s behaviour 
departs from idealised images of femininity and motherhood, the more stringently her 
behaviour is judged.36 Such narratives are compelling, as a conviction for criminal offending 
is a relatively unusual occurrence for women compared to that of men. Women commit fewer 
crimes than men, and their offending is generally less serious in nature and consequence (Milne 
and Turton 2018). As such, crime is most often seen as a male and masculine act (Ballinger 
2000), therefore women who offend are seen as the ‘other’ (Barlow 2016). 
                                                 
36 See further Edwards (1984). 
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However, justice, as a gendered experience, is more than the judgements made against 
individual women for their behaviour within the context of social expectations of appropriation 
to femininity. As scholars of feminist jurisprudence have outlined, the law and criminal justice 
processes are dominated by men in both development and application, and so women are 
judged by the ‘norm’ of male behaviour (Smart 1992; Lacey 1998; MacKinnon 2005). As 
Naffine (1990 100) argues, the standard of behaviour used to measure criminal liability is an 
‘ideal type’ who “possesses at least three essential qualities which match those of the socially 
powerful” – a middle-class man who evinces the style of masculinity of the middle-class. An 
intersectional analysis would add being of white race to this list (Hudson 2006). The nature of 
the ideal legal subject is that few men and fewer women are as “materially and culturally 
advantaged as the man of law” (Naffine 1990, 120), but, due to the sexual and economic 
divisions of labour, more men than women will be able to appropriate the way of life and 
qualities of the ‘ideal type’. It is against this idealised standard of life, and consequential 
behaviour, that all peoples are judged within law; as, to be seen to be a fair, impartial, non-
arbitrary and universal system, a universal person must be invoked, often described as the 
‘rational man’.  
For women who experience a crisis pregnancy, the assessment of their behaviour next 
to a standard of the ‘rational man’ results in some troublesome outcomes in terms of the 
judgements made in relation to their perceived deviant behaviour. Evidence from the three case 
studies illustrates how expectations of idealised femininity were used to measure the behaviour 
of the defendants. Such expectations can be identified as the rational man’s perception of how 
women should act. Evidence from the cases illustrates that members of the court held 
expectations that this was how the women should have behaved. Little to no consideration was 
given to the question as to why the defendants may not have behaved in these ways; neither 
did any of the court actors attempt to challenge the gendered assumptions that shroud the 
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expectations. Considering the vulnerabilities of the women in these cases, and women who 
experience crisis pregnancies in general, using the principles of the ‘rational man’ to assess and 
evaluate the defendants’ behaviours would seem to be unjust – failing to consider the wider 
complexities that surround crisis pregnancy and pregnancy in general.  
Use of gendered narratives to assess women’s behaviour is neither new to the offence 
of concealment, as argued above, nor to women’s experience of justice and the law more 
broadly. However, what the cases of concealment analysed here demonstrate is the extent to 
which narratives around pregnancy, which is expected of all women rather than just these 
defendants, transcend daily life, and are perpetuated within the courtroom and the judgements 
of ‘deviant’ pregnant women and mothers. 
 
Expectations of Pregnant Women in Concealment Cases 
Within the cases of concealment analysed here, the behaviour of the women is assessed next 
to ideals of motherhood. Feminists have long identified motherhood as one of the key markers 
of femininity; a socially and culturally organised role which women are expected to adhere to 
and perform in a certain way (Oakley 1974; Glenn et al. 1994).37 As Douglas and Michaels 
(2005, 3-4) argue,  
…no woman is truly complete or fulfilled unless she has kids, that women remain 
the best primary caretakers of children, and that to be a remotely decent mother, a 
woman has to devote her entire physical, psychological, emotional, and intellectual 
being, 24/7, to her children.  
                                                 
37 This does not refer to the biological function of bearing and caring for a child, but how society has interpreted 
and given meaning to the activity (Arendell 2000). 
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The myths of motherhood now extend to the period before the child is born, and prior to 
conception, with the notion of a woman being ‘pregnancy-ready’ (Williams 2016). Women are 
expected to be responsible for the wellbeing of the foetus and actively manage their behaviour 
to ensure that their unborn child has the optimum environment in which to grow and experience 
birth (Ruhl 1999; Lupton 2012; Weir 2006). This includes monitoring what is eaten and drunk 
(no rare beef or alcohol, for example), what conduct is completed in terms of physical and 
mental wellbeing, attending regular medical appointments, and conforming to medical advice 
and guidance. Strong links are made between the concept of the ‘responsible’ pregnant woman 
and the ‘good’ mother. Lupton (2011) concludes that the pressure on women to conform to 
dominant ideals presented in the discourse of maternal responsibility is inextricably linked to 
the principle of the ‘responsible mother’ who puts the needs of her foetus and child first. 
Such perceptions of motherhood were apparent in the sentencing hearings of the three 
women. Each woman was judged in terms of her behaviour as a mother and conclusions of 
these judgements appeared to assist in an assessment of the women’s responsibility for the 
survival of their infants, and also in assessment of their characters in general. The importance 
of the women’s roles as mothers is highlighted within these cases, as the defence and 
prosecution appear to fight over the defendants’ representations as ‘good’ mothers. In Lily’s 
case, the prosecution claimed that upon discovering she was pregnant Lily “told her GP that 
she did not want another child as she already had three boys with her ex-husband, and in 
particular she did not want another male child”. The claim that Lily had been planning to 
terminate her pregnancy due to the sex of the child was strongly disputed by the defence: 
Judge: The Prosecution suggestion is she did not want another boy. 
Defence: Your Honour, she does not accept that… 
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Later in the hearing, after being challenged by the judge, the prosecution provided evidence 
that Lily’s statement that she did not want any more boys was not in the context of seeking a 
termination; at the time of attempting to terminate the pregnancy, Lily did not know the sex of 
the baby. The prosecution offered an apology for this misrepresentation. The debate as to 
whether Lily wanted to terminate the pregnancy due to not wanting a boy indicates that such a 
reason for obtaining an abortion is perceived to be unacceptable. Stigma around abortion 
continues to be a factor for women when deciding to discontinue a pregnancy (Norris et al. 
2011), and Sheldon (1993) has argued that, in English law, legal abortion is constructed under 
the principle that women cannot be trusted to have an abortion for the ‘correct’ reasons. 
Sheldon outlines that public focus on abortion has been strongly connected to the idea of a 
woman being a ‘good’ mother and that this frames her decision to end the pregnancy. The focus 
on this aspect of Lily’s behaviour would suggest similar perceptions were held, and applied, in 
this case. 
In mitigation, Lily’s defence barrister drew on character references that indicated she was 
a good mother, 
… she went on to have two children, who your Honour will see from those letters 
she clearly presents as a good mother, she is involved in their lives and in the school 
life and is somebody who is thought well of by people within that local 
community… More to the point, in relation to the children, Social Services 
obviously became involved when her offending became known, but as your 
Honour will see from the pre-sentence report, they effectively have given her the 
all-clear... 38  
                                                 
38 The influence of Lily’s abusive partner on her offending was perceived as further evidence of her good 
character. 
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The portrayal of Lily as a good mother was accepted by the judge, who noted in sentencing,  
…but what can be said is that you were already the mother of three children and 
you have cared for children subsequently and cared well. 
…you have two small children whom on the account of everyone you are… 
bringing up well.  
A similar situation is presented in Hannah’s case, where the prosecution and defence 
disputed whether Hannah was a ‘good’ mother. The prosecution’s case was based on the 
principle that Hannah was guilty of the offences charged because she had not wanted to be a 
mother and therefore had failed to act to save the child’s life, 
The Crown’s case is that she had made it plain she didn’t want the child and that 
she could not have a child out of wedlock. She told no one for those reasons. She 
sought no assistance with the birth as she sought to keep it a secret. She sought no 
assistance for the newborn child and it died without any attempt, it would appear, 
by the defendant to give it the care the child required. 
In presenting this case, the prosecution made no reference to Hannah’s claim that she had fallen 
unconscious after the birth and that the child had already died by the time she awoke. As well 
as presenting Hannah as rejecting motherhood, the prosecution repeatedly focused on a number 
of Hannah’s other behaviours which can be interpreted as unmotherly, “It would appear no 
attempt was seemingly made to resuscitate the child, and after its death the defendant disposed 
of the body at her friend’s house”. Comments are also made about Hannah having gone out 
with her family approximately 3 to 4 hours after the death of the child, “…yet it is clear from 
the evidence that she went out with her family, as I have indicated, at about 8pm that night for 
a short time before returning home upset”; and that she had returned to work the next day,  
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[Employer] had no idea that the defendant was ever pregnant and indeed saw the 
defendant as usual on the [date] at work. This would be within something like 17 
hours of the defendant having given birth, maybe 19 hours.  
The prosecution also highlighted the circumstances in which Hannah left the body, “the birth 
fluids had not been washed off the child’s body”, and “It was lying, as I have indicated, near 
the wall, its head was lying on flagstones”. The significance of mentioning each of these 
elements could be interpreted as attempts to indicate that this is not ‘normal’ motherly 
behaviour. 
In Hannah’s defence, her barrister also drew on ideas of motherly behaviour to justify 
her actions following the death of the child, 
But lest there be any misinterpretation about her behaviour, this is not, I would 
submit, before you a callous, hard-hearted individual who simply swept this aside 
and carried on as normal, because she is, after all, a grieving mother, this was her 
child and within two hours or so of giving birth her child had died… 
Furthermore, the defence appear to be trying to equate Hannah’s experience to that of other 
mothers, 
To say that she was physically and emotionally in shock after what had happened 
I suppose is an understatement. The physical and emotional trauma that any woman 
undergoes in childbirth is multiplied to an extent which we can’t begin to imagine 
when that happens in isolation, in secret, contrary to all the beliefs that she has had 
from both sides of the family… 
As both quotes indicate, the defence were attempting to make Hannah appear like any ‘normal’ 
mother, experiencing the grief that is expected when a child dies. 
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As access to the full transcript in Sally’s case had not been granted, it is not possible to 
comment on how the prosecution and defence represented her in terms of her character or as a 
mother. However, what is clear from the sentencing remarks is the judge’s suggestion that 
Sally’s past behaviour indicated she was a person of dubious character, in terms of her 
relationships with men and subsequent pregnancies. 
You have one child by your first marriage which ended in 1982. You have two 
children by your second marriage which ended in about 1987. Thereafter you led 
what can only be referred to as a chaotic and dysfunctional lifestyle, in the course 
of which you became pregnant on a number of occasions.   
Furthermore, the judge made reference to Sally’s age being a mitigating factor, stating, “at your 
age there is no risk of any future similar activity”. The judge was arguing that Sally’s role as a 
mother was a key factor in her offending, and, as she could no longer bear children, her risk to 
further foetuses/children was removed. 
However, in contrast to these negative representations of Sally as a mother, the judge 
also drew on ideals of motherhood when explaining other mitigating factors,  
You have had the trauma of suffering four stillborn deaths and have had to live 
with the consequences of those deaths and the concealment which must have 
caused you many anxious and distressing moments. With those remains being with 
you as close as your own bedroom there can’t have been any closure for you in 
relation to any of those young children, and this is a matter which has gone and on 
for many, many years.  
It is not possible to know whether the prosecution and/or defence used representations of 
motherhood to argue their positions, but presenting an experience of trauma as a mitigating 
factor suggests that this is the behaviour the court expects of mothers – that the death of a child 
27 
 
will be experienced as a traumatic loss. While research has been conducted into the experience 
of stillbirth on mothers (Mullan and Horton 2011; Murphy 2012), I am unaware of any that has 
considered the experience among women who conceal/deny their pregnancy. However, it 
appears that the court is of the opinion that grief and trauma is the ‘normal’ and ‘motherly' 
response, regardless of the experience of pregnancy. 
Judgement of Sally’s behaviour goes beyond the debate as to whether she had responded 
as a ‘good’ mother and moves directly to address her behaviour during pregnancy. The judge 
expressed concern for the physical health of her unborn children due to Sally’s actions, 
suggesting that she may have been culpable for her foetuses’ inability to survive, 
…whilst the circumstances and reasons for the stillborn births will never fully be 
able to be established, your chaotic lifestyle choices, including alcohol abuse and 
promiscuity at the time of your pregnancies was such as to put the good health of 
any unborn child at risk. 
Thus, in this case, it was not only suggested that Sally may have caused the death of these 
children if they had been live born (which, as outlined, was unprovable and was never formally 
raised as a charge), but also that she may have caused them to be stillborn due to her behaviour. 
Similarly, in Hannah’s case, as well as the prosecution basing their case on Hannah not seeking 
assistance for the child because she had not wanted to be a mother, during sentencing the judge 
directly implied that she was responsible for the death of the child, “The tragedy that followed 
is of the immense disaster for this child. She died within two hours of her birth, and had you 
acted appropriately her life could have been saved”. Such a comment was made despite both 
the prosecution and defence acknowledging that Hannah stated that she had passed out 
following the birth and no contrary evidence was offered. With this in mind, one reading of the 
judge’s comment is that acting appropriately would have required Hannah to have informed 
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someone of her pregnancy, and, as a consequence, would have been unlikely to be in a position 
of giving birth alone and passing out, leaving the child unattended.  
The broader suggestion being made in both Hannah and Sally’s cases is that the women 
should have put the welfare of their foetuses before their own. Such focus on the women’s 
behaviour in pregnancy is problematic for a number of reasons, not least because the offence 
of concealment is only concerned with the behaviour of the defendant after the child has been 
born and has died; although within the course of sentencing such evidence can be used to 
demonstrate moral character and thus justify the sentence. The suggestion that the women 
should put their foetuses’ welfare before their own relates back to the ideology of motherhood, 
as I have outlined above. Expectation that women should put the foetus first is deeply 
problematic, but sadly an all too common experience for women; this is despite statutory and 
common law clearly indicating that a woman has no obligation or legal duty to her unborn 
child, 39 including her decision to seek and adhere to medical guidance and assistance during 
pregnancy and birth, as rulings in cases of non-consensual caesarean sections illustrate.40 The 
courts continue to uphold the principle that “while pregnancy increases the personal 
responsibilities of a woman it does not diminish her entitlement to decide whether or not to 
undergo medical treatment” if she is of “sound mind”.41 Furthermore, historic legal authority 
clearly indicates that a woman has no obligation to obtain medical care during birth, and a 
woman will not be guilty of manslaughter if the baby dies at birth following the woman’s 
                                                 
39 Re F (In Utero) (Wardship) [1988] 2 FLR 307; Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority v First-tier Tribunal 
(Social Entitlement Chamber) (British Pregnancy Advisory Service and others intervening) [2014] EWCA Civ 
1554. 
40 St. George’s Healthcare N.H.S. Trust v S and R v Collins and Others [1999] Fam 26; [1998] 3 WLR 936. 
41 Ibid, at 950. 
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decision to deliver alone.42 This is still the case, even if it can be proven that a woman was 
neglectful towards her unborn child.43 The only criminal offence that can be committed against 
the foetus is child destruction, which prohibits the destruction of “the life of a child capable of 
being born alive… before it has an existence independent of its mother”.44 However, this 
offence requires intent to destroy the foetus and a wilful act; and so omissions and acts 
committed without intent to harm, such as consuming alcohol for pleasure and not with an 
intention to kill the foetus, or not obtaining medical assistance during pregnancy and labour, 
would not fall under the scope of the offence. 
Despite legal protection of pregnant women’s autonomy, maternal freedom is not always 
the normative experience, as there is substantial evidence that women’s rights during 
pregnancy, labour and delivery are regularly infringed by ‘obstetric hegemony’ (Anderson 
2004). For example, in their survey of women’s experiences of childbirth, Birthrights (2013) 
found a mixed picture of maternity care across the UK, with only half of women agreeing they 
had the birth they wanted, indicating lack of choice, and only 57% of women reporting they 
felt in control of their birth. These findings support other research, from the UK and other 
countries, that indicates there is a conflict between the woman’s legal right to autonomy in 
birth and the role doctors and midwives feel they play in securing the welfare of the foetus 
(Baker et al. 2005; Kruske et al. 2013; Prochaska 2013). In such circumstances, the existence 
                                                 
42 R v Knight [1860] 2 F&F 46. 
43 An offence of homicide only occurs if it is proven that the defendant was neglectful towards the child once it 
had been completely born and obtained legal personality, R v Izod [1904] 20 Cox CC 690. While not subject to 
criminal law, pre-birth neglect can result in child protection plans being implemented by the local authority 
(Masson and Dickens 2015). 
44 Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, s 1. Procuring a miscarriage criminalises the intentional ending of the 
pregnancy. 
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of ‘hard’ law protecting autonomy is negated, as women report feeling coerced and forced into 
making decisions against their wishes through the mechanisms of obstetric hegemony 
(Anderson 2004). As Rothman (1989) and Gregg (1995) argue, the increased ‘choice’ provided 
through developing technology and knowledge about pregnancy and childbirth has had the 
impact of limiting women’s freedom to ‘choose’; more pressure is placed on women to make 
decisions in line with what professionals feel are ‘correct’ and best practice, which effectively 
destroys the ideology of choice.  
While such research is not informed by the experiences of women like Hannah, Lily and 
Sally, the evidence and narratives about motherhood presented in their court hearings reflect 
the thrust of perceptions that support obstetric hegemony and the role and responsibility of the 
ideal mother. By highlighting what are perceived to be failings of the women as pregnant 
women, the prosecution in these cases appear to indicate that the women’s culpabilities lay in 
their failure to act as suitable mothers and, by extension, women. While they were technically 
being sanctioned for hiding the dead body of the child, evidence from the transcripts would 
suggest that the courts were as concerned, if not more concerned, with the women’s acts of 
deviancy in relation to their failings in light of the ideals of motherhood. As such, it would 
appear that the offence of concealment provides an unofficial mechanism to punish women for 
such behaviour. As with unproven homicide, using the offence of concealment to sanction the 
behaviour of women that may have caused prenatal harm is a worrying extension of criminal 
law. Using concealment to display social displeasure moves beyond the scope of not only the 
concealment legislation, but also the long-held principles of the born alive rule, and directly 
challenges women’s rights to autonomy (Brazier 1999). 
While use of the ideology of hegemonic obstetrics to assess the behaviour of women in 
the court room is deeply problematic when used to judge the qualities of any woman, it is 
specifically problematic in relation to the cases examined here, and other cases of concealment. 
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As noted, women who conceal/deny pregnancy which results in the death of the child, are likely 
to be experiencing a crisis pregnancy. As such, they are very likely to have significantly more 
vulnerabilities than the ‘rational man’ (Fineman 2008), as in the cases presented here. And yet, 
their behaviour is judged against the ideals of motherhood – the woman who can and will 
readily conform to what is perceived to be best for baby – to follow all medical advice and put 
the needs of the foetus first. The analysis presented here has consequences for the fairness and 
impartiality of law. As Naffine (1990 123) argues, to question the status of the legal subject 
against whom we are all judged is to “question, at a most fundamental level, the fairness and 
therefore the justice of law”. 
 
Conclusion: What Next for Concealment of Birth 
With consideration of the problematic nature of the offence of concealment, I will conclude by 
examining the future for this ‘stop-gap’ in English law. In doing so, it is important to note that 
the offence can and does fulfil a function for law enforcers, as evident in continued use of the 
offence. In the cases examined here, the women exhibited behaviour that is widely understood 
to be wrong or deviant, beyond suspected but unproven homicide, and failings as a mother; 
both of which I have argued should not be the focus of criminal sanction. However, the other 
illegal behaviours exhibited by the women are captured by alternative offences and therefore 
concealment is not required as an offence to punish these wrongs; specifically, the 
inappropriate disposal of a body,45 and failure to register a birth or stillbirth.46 The most serious 
consequence of the behaviour of the women convicted of concealment is that their actions have 
prevented an investigation into the cause of death of the infants, potentially preventing law 
                                                 
45 Jones and Quigley (2016) outline the wrongfulness of inappropriate disposal of a body, and the criminal 
offences that capture this wrongful behaviour. 
46 Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953, ss 1-2 and 36, punishable by a fine of up to £200. 
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enforcers from determining that the child had been a victim of homicide. The judge raised this 
point in Lily’s case during sentencing, “These offences… [are] serious because it means that 
the authorities can never establish in circumstances such as this what has happened to the child, 
and that is something that everybody is entitled to know...” However, as Jones and Quigley 
(2016) have argued in relation to a similar offence preventing a lawful and decent burial, other 
offences exist to capture the wrong-doing of hiding a corpse to prevent discovery of further 
criminal behaviour; disposal of a corpse with intent to obstruct or prevent a coroner's inquest 
when there is a duty to hold one,47 and perverting the course of justice:48 both have a maximum 
life sentence. Therefore, the offence of concealment is not needed to capture the wrong of 
hiding a dead body to conceal criminal behaviour and to facilitate prosecution; however, it 
should be noted that concealment would be far easier to prove than either of the alternative 
offences. 
Considering the gendered injustice of concealment, as outlined above, and that other 
offences exist to capture the wrongs of the behaviour, I conclude that there is no place for the 
offence of concealment, and it should be removed from criminal law. The statute is an archaic 
provision; a product of the nineteenth century, reflecting the values of that time in relation to 
women’s sexuality and their positions as mothers and wives, specifically as pregnant single 
women. Analysis of recent cases illustrates that the offence continues to be used in line with 
misogynistic expectations of women’s behaviours in relation to motherhood and pregnancy. 
Analysis of concealment, presented here, speaks to a wider debate surrounding women’s rights 
to control their own bodies, particularly in relation to sexual activity and pregnancy. Abortion 
remains a criminal offence (Sheldon 2016), and recent civil court cases would suggest there is 
                                                 
47 R v Purcy [1934] 24 Cr. App. R. 70. 
48 R v Williams [1991] 92 Cr App R 158. See Jones and Quigley (2016) for detailed analysis of how both offences 
could be applied to individuals who conceal a dead body. 
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a creep towards the sanctioning of women for ‘inappropriate’ conduct while pregnant. 49 
Critiques of offences, such as concealment, are important for women’s equality and rights to 
freedom and autonomy. As evidenced here, through a feminist analysis of how law is applied, 
it is possible to identify the structural prejudices that exist within law, and how they impact not 
only those directly involved in cases, but all women, due to the challenges such legal action 
poses to women’s rights to bodily autonomy and reproductive freedom. 
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